8e79f2ee9c
Based on Nekogram. Key additions: - Rebrand to FoxiGram (app name, APK name, applicationId com.foxigram.app) - Embedded Xray (VLESS+Reality) proxy client via JNI libxray.so - Bundled hidden one-tap proxies (LTE + WiFi), read-only in UI - Auto-restore proxy on restart, rebind to active network (LTE/WiFi) - Server credentials externalized to git-ignored XrayServers.java (+ template) - libxray Go source included; compiled .so, keystore, google-services.json ignored
98 lines
3.2 KiB
C++
98 lines
3.2 KiB
C++
// Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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//
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// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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// You may obtain a copy of the License at
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//
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// https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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//
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// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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// limitations under the License.
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/hmac.h>
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#include "../internal.h"
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int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(const char *password, size_t password_len,
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const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_len, uint32_t iterations,
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const EVP_MD *digest, size_t key_len, uint8_t *out_key) {
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// See RFC 8018, section 5.2.
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bssl::ScopedHMAC_CTX hctx;
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if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx.get(), password, password_len, digest, NULL)) {
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return 0;
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}
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uint32_t i = 1;
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size_t md_len = EVP_MD_size(digest);
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while (key_len > 0) {
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size_t todo = md_len;
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if (todo > key_len) {
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todo = key_len;
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}
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uint8_t i_buf[4];
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i_buf[0] = (uint8_t)((i >> 24) & 0xff);
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i_buf[1] = (uint8_t)((i >> 16) & 0xff);
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i_buf[2] = (uint8_t)((i >> 8) & 0xff);
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i_buf[3] = (uint8_t)(i & 0xff);
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// Compute U_1.
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uint8_t digest_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx.get(), NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) ||
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!HMAC_Update(hctx.get(), salt, salt_len) ||
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!HMAC_Update(hctx.get(), i_buf, 4) ||
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!HMAC_Final(hctx.get(), digest_tmp, NULL)) {
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return 0;
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}
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OPENSSL_memcpy(out_key, digest_tmp, todo);
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for (uint32_t j = 1; j < iterations; j++) {
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// Compute the remaining U_* values and XOR.
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if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx.get(), NULL, 0, NULL, NULL) ||
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!HMAC_Update(hctx.get(), digest_tmp, md_len) ||
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!HMAC_Final(hctx.get(), digest_tmp, NULL)) {
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return 0;
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}
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for (size_t k = 0; k < todo; k++) {
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out_key[k] ^= digest_tmp[k];
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}
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}
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key_len -= todo;
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out_key += todo;
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i++;
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}
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// RFC 8018 describes iterations (c) as being a "positive integer", so a
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// value of 0 is an error.
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//
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// Unfortunately not all consumers of PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC() check their return
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// value, expecting it to succeed and unconditionally using |out_key|. As a
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// precaution for such callsites in external code, the old behavior of
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// iterations < 1 being treated as iterations == 1 is preserved, but
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// additionally an error result is returned.
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//
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// TODO(eroman): Figure out how to remove this compatibility hack, or change
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// the default to something more sensible like 2048.
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if (iterations == 0) {
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(const char *password, size_t password_len,
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const uint8_t *salt, size_t salt_len,
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uint32_t iterations, size_t key_len,
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uint8_t *out_key) {
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return PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(password, password_len, salt, salt_len, iterations,
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EVP_sha1(), key_len, out_key);
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}
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