Based on Nekogram. Key additions: - Rebrand to FoxiGram (app name, APK name, applicationId com.foxigram.app) - Embedded Xray (VLESS+Reality) proxy client via JNI libxray.so - Bundled hidden one-tap proxies (LTE + WiFi), read-only in UI - Auto-restore proxy on restart, rebind to active network (LTE/WiFi) - Server credentials externalized to git-ignored XrayServers.java (+ template) - libxray Go source included; compiled .so, keystore, google-services.json ignored
215 lines
5.9 KiB
C++
215 lines
5.9 KiB
C++
// Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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//
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// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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// You may obtain a copy of the License at
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//
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// https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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//
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// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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// limitations under the License.
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#include <openssl/hmac.h>
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/digest.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include "../../internal.h"
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#include "../service_indicator/internal.h"
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uint8_t *HMAC(const EVP_MD *evp_md, const void *key, size_t key_len,
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const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len, uint8_t *out,
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unsigned int *out_len) {
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HMAC_CTX ctx;
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HMAC_CTX_init(&ctx);
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// The underlying hash functions should not set the FIPS service indicator
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// until all operations have completed.
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FIPS_service_indicator_lock_state();
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const int ok = HMAC_Init_ex(&ctx, key, key_len, evp_md, NULL) &&
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HMAC_Update(&ctx, data, data_len) &&
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HMAC_Final(&ctx, out, out_len);
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FIPS_service_indicator_unlock_state();
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HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
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if (!ok) {
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return NULL;
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}
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HMAC_verify_service_indicator(evp_md);
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return out;
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}
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void HMAC_CTX_init(HMAC_CTX *ctx) {
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ctx->md = NULL;
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EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx->i_ctx);
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EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx->o_ctx);
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EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx->md_ctx);
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}
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HMAC_CTX *HMAC_CTX_new(void) {
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HMAC_CTX *ctx =
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reinterpret_cast<HMAC_CTX *>(OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(HMAC_CTX)));
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if (ctx != NULL) {
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HMAC_CTX_init(ctx);
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}
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return ctx;
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}
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void HMAC_CTX_cleanup(HMAC_CTX *ctx) {
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EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->i_ctx);
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EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->o_ctx);
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EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->md_ctx);
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OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx, sizeof(HMAC_CTX));
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}
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void HMAC_CTX_cleanse(HMAC_CTX *ctx) {
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EVP_MD_CTX_cleanse(&ctx->i_ctx);
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EVP_MD_CTX_cleanse(&ctx->o_ctx);
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EVP_MD_CTX_cleanse(&ctx->md_ctx);
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OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx, sizeof(HMAC_CTX));
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}
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void HMAC_CTX_free(HMAC_CTX *ctx) {
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if (ctx == NULL) {
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return;
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}
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HMAC_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
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OPENSSL_free(ctx);
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}
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int HMAC_Init_ex(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, size_t key_len,
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const EVP_MD *md, ENGINE *impl) {
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int ret = 0;
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FIPS_service_indicator_lock_state();
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if (md == NULL) {
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md = ctx->md;
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}
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// If either |key| is non-NULL or |md| has changed, initialize with a new key
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// rather than rewinding the previous one.
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//
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// TODO(davidben,eroman): Passing the previous |md| with a NULL |key| is
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// ambiguous between using the empty key and reusing the previous key. There
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// exist callers which intend the latter, but the former is an awkward edge
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// case. Fix to API to avoid this.
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if (md != ctx->md || key != NULL) {
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uint8_t pad[EVP_MAX_MD_BLOCK_SIZE];
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uint8_t key_block[EVP_MAX_MD_BLOCK_SIZE];
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unsigned key_block_len;
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size_t block_size = EVP_MD_block_size(md);
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assert(block_size <= sizeof(key_block));
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assert(EVP_MD_size(md) <= block_size);
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if (block_size < key_len) {
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// Long keys are hashed.
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if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx->md_ctx, md, impl) ||
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!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->md_ctx, key, key_len) ||
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!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx->md_ctx, key_block, &key_block_len)) {
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goto out;
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}
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} else {
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assert(key_len <= sizeof(key_block));
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OPENSSL_memcpy(key_block, key, key_len);
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key_block_len = (unsigned)key_len;
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}
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// Keys are then padded with zeros.
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OPENSSL_memset(key_block + key_block_len, 0, block_size - key_block_len);
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for (size_t i = 0; i < block_size; i++) {
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pad[i] = 0x36 ^ key_block[i];
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}
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if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx->i_ctx, md, impl) ||
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!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->i_ctx, pad, block_size)) {
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goto out;
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}
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for (size_t i = 0; i < block_size; i++) {
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pad[i] = 0x5c ^ key_block[i];
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}
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if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx->o_ctx, md, impl) ||
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!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->o_ctx, pad, block_size)) {
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goto out;
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}
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ctx->md = md;
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}
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ret = EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx->md_ctx, &ctx->i_ctx);
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out:
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FIPS_service_indicator_unlock_state();
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return ret;
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}
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int HMAC_Update(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len) {
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return EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->md_ctx, data, data_len);
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}
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int HMAC_Final(HMAC_CTX *ctx, uint8_t *out, unsigned int *out_len) {
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int ret = 0;
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unsigned int i;
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uint8_t buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
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FIPS_service_indicator_lock_state();
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// TODO(davidben): The only thing that can officially fail here is
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// |EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex|, but even that should be impossible in this case.
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if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx->md_ctx, buf, &i) ||
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!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx->md_ctx, &ctx->o_ctx) ||
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!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->md_ctx, buf, i) ||
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!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx->md_ctx, out, out_len)) {
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*out_len = 0;
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goto out;
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}
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ret = 1;
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out:
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FIPS_service_indicator_unlock_state();
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if (ret) {
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HMAC_verify_service_indicator(ctx->md);
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}
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return ret;
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}
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size_t HMAC_size(const HMAC_CTX *ctx) { return EVP_MD_size(ctx->md); }
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const EVP_MD *HMAC_CTX_get_md(const HMAC_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->md; }
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int HMAC_CTX_copy_ex(HMAC_CTX *dest, const HMAC_CTX *src) {
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if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&dest->i_ctx, &src->i_ctx) ||
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!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&dest->o_ctx, &src->o_ctx) ||
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!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&dest->md_ctx, &src->md_ctx)) {
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return 0;
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}
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dest->md = src->md;
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return 1;
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}
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void HMAC_CTX_reset(HMAC_CTX *ctx) {
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HMAC_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
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HMAC_CTX_init(ctx);
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}
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int HMAC_Init(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, int key_len, const EVP_MD *md) {
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if (key && md) {
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HMAC_CTX_init(ctx);
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}
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return HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, key, key_len, md, NULL);
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}
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int HMAC_CTX_copy(HMAC_CTX *dest, const HMAC_CTX *src) {
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HMAC_CTX_init(dest);
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return HMAC_CTX_copy_ex(dest, src);
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}
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