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FoxiGram/TMessagesProj/jni/boringssl/crypto/rand/urandom_test.cc
instant992 8e79f2ee9c FoxiGram: Telegram client with built-in Xray VLESS proxy 
Based on Nekogram. Key additions:
- Rebrand to FoxiGram (app name, APK name, applicationId com.foxigram.app)
- Embedded Xray (VLESS+Reality) proxy client via JNI libxray.so
- Bundled hidden one-tap proxies (LTE + WiFi), read-only in UI
- Auto-restore proxy on restart, rebind to active network (LTE/WiFi)
- Server credentials externalized to git-ignored XrayServers.java (+ template)
- libxray Go source included; compiled .so, keystore, google-services.json ignored
2026-06-08 16:41:07 +04:00

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// Copyright 2019 The BoringSSL Authors
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
//
// https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
#include <gtest/gtest.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <optional>
#include <openssl/bytestring.h>
#include <openssl/ctrdrbg.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include "../internal.h"
#include "getrandom_fillin.h"
#if (defined(OPENSSL_X86_64) || defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64)) && \
!defined(BORINGSSL_SHARED_LIBRARY) && defined(OPENSSL_RAND_URANDOM) && \
defined(USE_NR_getrandom)
#include <elf.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <sys/ptrace.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <sys/user.h>
namespace {
#if !defined(PTRACE_O_EXITKILL)
#define PTRACE_O_EXITKILL (1 << 20)
#endif
#if defined(OPENSSL_ANDROID)
static const bool kIsAndroid = true;
#else
static const bool kIsAndroid = false;
#endif
#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
static const bool kIsFIPS = true;
#else
static const bool kIsFIPS = false;
#endif
static const bool kUsesDaemon = kIsFIPS && kIsAndroid;
// kDaemonWriteLength is the number of bytes that the entropy daemon writes.
static const size_t kDaemonWriteLength = 496;
// This test can be run with $OPENSSL_ia32cap=~0x4000000000000000 in order to
// simulate the absence of RDRAND of machines that have it.
// Event represents a system call from urandom.c that is observed by the ptrace
// code in |GetTrace|.
struct Event {
enum class Syscall {
kGetRandom,
kOpen,
kUrandomRead,
kSocket,
kConnect,
kSocketRead,
kSocketClose,
kAbort,
};
explicit Event(Syscall syscall) : type(syscall) {}
bool operator==(const Event &other) const {
return type == other.type && //
length == other.length && //
flags == other.flags && //
filename == other.filename;
}
static Event GetRandom(size_t length, unsigned flags) {
Event e(Syscall::kGetRandom);
e.length = length;
e.flags = flags;
return e;
}
static Event Open(const std::string &filename) {
Event e(Syscall::kOpen);
e.filename = filename;
return e;
}
static Event UrandomRead(size_t length) {
Event e(Syscall::kUrandomRead);
e.length = length;
return e;
}
static Event Socket() {
Event e(Syscall::kSocket);
return e;
}
static Event Connect() {
Event e(Syscall::kConnect);
return e;
}
static Event SocketRead(size_t length) {
Event e(Syscall::kSocketRead);
e.length = length;
return e;
}
static Event SocketClose() {
Event e(Syscall::kSocketClose);
return e;
}
static Event Abort() {
Event e(Syscall::kAbort);
return e;
}
std::string String() const {
char buf[256];
switch (type) {
case Syscall::kGetRandom:
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "getrandom(_, %zu, %u)", length, flags);
break;
case Syscall::kOpen:
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "open(%s, _)", filename.c_str());
break;
case Syscall::kUrandomRead:
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "read(urandom_fd, _, %zu)", length);
break;
case Syscall::kSocket:
return "socket(UNIX, STREAM, _)";
case Syscall::kConnect:
return "connect(sock, _, _)";
case Syscall::kSocketRead:
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "read(sock_fd, _, %zu)", length);
break;
case Syscall::kSocketClose:
return "close(sock)";
case Syscall::kAbort:
return "abort()";
}
return std::string(buf);
}
const Syscall type;
size_t length = 0;
unsigned flags = 0;
std::string filename;
};
static std::string ToString(const std::vector<Event> &trace) {
std::string ret;
for (const auto &event : trace) {
if (!ret.empty()) {
ret += ", ";
}
ret += event.String();
}
return ret;
}
// The following are flags to tell |GetTrace| to inject faults, using ptrace,
// into the entropy-related system calls.
// getrandom gives |ENOSYS|.
static const unsigned NO_GETRANDOM = 1;
// opening /dev/urandom fails.
static const unsigned NO_URANDOM = 2;
// getrandom always returns |EAGAIN| if given |GRNG_NONBLOCK|.
static const unsigned GETRANDOM_NOT_READY = 4;
// getrandom gives |EINVAL| unless |NO_GETRANDOM| is set.
static const unsigned GETRANDOM_ERROR = 8;
// Reading from /dev/urandom gives |EINVAL|.
static const unsigned URANDOM_ERROR = 16;
static const unsigned SOCKET_ERROR = 32;
static const unsigned CONNECT_ERROR = 64;
static const unsigned SOCKET_READ_ERROR = 128;
static const unsigned SOCKET_READ_SHORT = 256;
static const unsigned NEXT_FLAG = 512;
// regs_read fetches the registers of |child_pid| and writes them to |out_regs|.
// That structure will contain at least the following members:
// syscall: the syscall number, if registers were read just before entering
// one.
// args[0..2]: syscall arguments, if registers were read just before
// entering one.
// ret: the syscall return value, if registers were read just after finishing
// one.
//
// This call returns true on success and false otherwise.
static bool regs_read(struct regs *out_regs, int child_pid);
// regs_set_ret sets the return value of the system call that |child_pid| has
// just finished, to |ret|. It returns true on success and false otherwise.
static bool regs_set_ret(int child_pid, int ret);
// regs_break_syscall causes the system call that |child_pid| is about to enter
// to fail to run.
static bool regs_break_syscall(int child_pid, const struct regs *orig_regs);
struct regs {
uintptr_t syscall;
uintptr_t args[3];
uintptr_t ret;
struct user_regs_struct regs;
};
#if defined(OPENSSL_X86_64)
static bool regs_read(struct regs *out_regs, int child_pid) {
if (ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGS, child_pid, nullptr, &out_regs->regs) != 0) {
return false;
}
out_regs->syscall = out_regs->regs.orig_rax;
out_regs->ret = out_regs->regs.rax;
out_regs->args[0] = out_regs->regs.rdi;
out_regs->args[1] = out_regs->regs.rsi;
out_regs->args[2] = out_regs->regs.rdx;
return true;
}
static bool regs_set_ret(int child_pid, int ret) {
struct regs regs;
if (!regs_read(&regs, child_pid)) {
return false;
}
regs.regs.rax = ret;
return ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGS, child_pid, nullptr, &regs.regs) == 0;
}
static bool regs_break_syscall(int child_pid, const struct regs *orig_regs) {
// Replace the syscall number with -1 to cause the kernel to fail the call.
struct user_regs_struct regs = orig_regs->regs;
regs.orig_rax = -1;
return ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGS, child_pid, nullptr, &regs) == 0;
}
#elif defined(OPENSSL_AARCH64)
static bool regs_read(struct regs *out_regs, int child_pid) {
struct iovec io;
io.iov_base = &out_regs->regs;
io.iov_len = sizeof(out_regs->regs);
if (ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET, child_pid, NT_PRSTATUS, &io) != 0) {
return false;
}
out_regs->syscall = out_regs->regs.regs[8];
out_regs->ret = out_regs->regs.regs[0];
out_regs->args[0] = out_regs->regs.regs[0];
out_regs->args[1] = out_regs->regs.regs[1];
out_regs->args[2] = out_regs->regs.regs[2];
return true;
}
static bool set_regset(int child_pid, int regset, const void *data,
size_t len) {
struct iovec io;
io.iov_base = const_cast<void *>(data);
io.iov_len = len;
return ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGSET, child_pid, reinterpret_cast<void *>(regset),
&io) == 0;
}
static bool regs_set_ret(int child_pid, int ret) {
struct regs regs;
if (!regs_read(&regs, child_pid)) {
return false;
}
regs.regs.regs[0] = ret;
return set_regset(child_pid, NT_PRSTATUS, &regs.regs, sizeof(regs.regs));
}
static bool regs_break_syscall(int child_pid, const struct regs *orig_regs) {
// Replace the syscall number with -1 to cause the kernel to fail the call.
int syscall = -1;
return set_regset(child_pid, NT_ARM_SYSTEM_CALL, &syscall, sizeof(syscall));
}
#endif
// memcpy_to_remote copies |n| bytes from |in_src| in the local address space,
// to |dest| in the address space of |child_pid|.
static void memcpy_to_remote(int child_pid, uint64_t dest, const void *in_src,
size_t n) {
const uint8_t *src = reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t *>(in_src);
// ptrace always works with ill-defined "words", which appear to be 64-bit
// on 64-bit systems.
#if !defined(OPENSSL_64_BIT)
#error "This code probably doesn't work"
#endif
while (n) {
const uintptr_t aligned_addr = dest & ~7;
const uintptr_t offset = dest - aligned_addr;
const size_t space = 8 - offset;
size_t todo = n;
if (todo > space) {
todo = space;
}
uint64_t word;
if (offset == 0 && todo == 8) {
word = CRYPTO_load_u64_le(src);
} else {
uint8_t bytes[8];
CRYPTO_store_u64_le(
bytes, ptrace(PTRACE_PEEKDATA, child_pid,
reinterpret_cast<void *>(aligned_addr), nullptr));
memcpy(&bytes[offset], src, todo);
word = CRYPTO_load_u64_le(bytes);
}
ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_POKEDATA, child_pid,
reinterpret_cast<void *>(aligned_addr),
reinterpret_cast<void *>(word)));
src += todo;
n -= todo;
dest += todo;
}
}
static uint8_t get_byte_from_remote(int child_pid, uint64_t ptr) {
// ptrace always works with ill-defined "words", which appear to be 64-bit
// on 64-bit systems.
#if !defined(OPENSSL_64_BIT)
#error "This code probably doesn't work"
#endif
const uintptr_t aligned_addr = ptr & ~7;
const uintptr_t offset = ptr - aligned_addr;
uint64_t word = ptrace(PTRACE_PEEKDATA, child_pid,
reinterpret_cast<void *>(aligned_addr), 0);
uint8_t bytes[8];
CRYPTO_store_u64_le(bytes, word);
return bytes[offset];
}
static std::string get_string_from_remote(int child_pid, uint64_t ptr) {
std::string ret;
for (;;) {
const uint8_t byte = get_byte_from_remote(child_pid, ptr);
if (byte == 0) {
break;
}
ret.push_back((char)byte);
ptr++;
}
return ret;
}
// GetTrace runs |thunk| in a forked process and observes the resulting system
// calls using ptrace. It simulates a variety of failures based on the contents
// of |flags| and records the observed events by appending to |out_trace|.
static void GetTrace(std::vector<Event> *out_trace, unsigned flags,
std::function<void()> thunk) {
const int child_pid = fork();
ASSERT_NE(-1, child_pid);
if (child_pid == 0) {
// Child process
if (ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME, 0, 0, 0) != 0) {
perror("PTRACE_TRACEME");
_exit(1);
}
raise(SIGSTOP);
thunk();
_exit(0);
}
// Parent process
int status;
ASSERT_EQ(child_pid, waitpid(child_pid, &status, 0));
ASSERT_TRUE(WIFSTOPPED(status) && WSTOPSIG(status) == SIGSTOP)
<< "Child was not stopped with SIGSTOP: " << status;
// Set options so that:
// a) the child process is killed once this process dies.
// b) System calls result in a WSTOPSIG value of (SIGTRAP | 0x80) rather
// than just SIGTRAP. (This doesn't matter here, but it's recommended
// practice so that it's distinct from the signal itself.)
ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_SETOPTIONS, child_pid, nullptr,
PTRACE_O_EXITKILL | PTRACE_O_TRACESYSGOOD))
<< strerror(errno);
// urandom_fd tracks the file descriptor number for /dev/urandom in the child
// process, if it opens it.
int urandom_fd = -1;
// sock_fd tracks the file descriptor number for the socket to the entropy
// daemon, if one is opened.
int sock_fd = -1;
for (;;) {
// Advance the child to the next system call.
ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_SYSCALL, child_pid, 0, 0));
ASSERT_EQ(child_pid, waitpid(child_pid, &status, 0));
// The child may have aborted rather than made a system call.
if (WIFSTOPPED(status) && WSTOPSIG(status) == SIGABRT) {
out_trace->push_back(Event::Abort());
break;
}
// Otherwise the only valid ptrace event is a system call stop.
ASSERT_TRUE(WIFSTOPPED(status) && WSTOPSIG(status) == (SIGTRAP | 0x80))
<< "Child was not stopped with a syscall stop: " << status;
struct regs regs;
ASSERT_TRUE(regs_read(&regs, child_pid));
bool is_opening_urandom = false;
bool is_socket_call = false;
bool is_socket_read = false;
uint64_t socket_read_bytes = 0;
// force_result is unset to indicate that the system call should run
// normally. Otherwise it's, e.g. -EINVAL, to indicate that the system call
// should not run and that the given value should be injected on return.
std::optional<int> force_result;
switch (regs.syscall) {
case __NR_getrandom:
if (flags & NO_GETRANDOM) {
force_result = -ENOSYS;
} else if (flags & GETRANDOM_ERROR) {
force_result = -EINVAL;
} else if (flags & GETRANDOM_NOT_READY) {
if (regs.args[2] & GRND_NONBLOCK) {
force_result = -EAGAIN;
}
}
out_trace->push_back(
Event::GetRandom(/*length=*/regs.args[1], /*flags=*/regs.args[2]));
break;
case __NR_openat:
#if defined(OPENSSL_X86_64)
case __NR_open:
#endif
{
uintptr_t filename_ptr =
(regs.syscall == __NR_openat) ? regs.args[1] : regs.args[0];
const std::string filename =
get_string_from_remote(child_pid, filename_ptr);
if (filename.find("/dev/__properties__/") == 0) {
// Android may try opening these files as part of SELinux support.
// They are ignored here.
} else {
out_trace->push_back(Event::Open(filename));
}
is_opening_urandom = (filename == "/dev/urandom");
if (is_opening_urandom && (flags & NO_URANDOM)) {
force_result = -ENOENT;
}
break;
}
case __NR_read: {
const int read_fd = regs.args[0];
if (urandom_fd >= 0 && urandom_fd == read_fd) {
out_trace->push_back(Event::UrandomRead(/*length=*/regs.args[2]));
if (flags & URANDOM_ERROR) {
force_result = -EINVAL;
}
} else if (sock_fd >= 0 && sock_fd == read_fd) {
uint64_t length = regs.args[2];
out_trace->push_back(Event::SocketRead(length));
if (flags & SOCKET_READ_ERROR) {
force_result = -EINVAL;
} else {
is_socket_read = true;
socket_read_bytes = length;
if (flags & SOCKET_READ_SHORT) {
ASSERT_GT(socket_read_bytes, 0u);
socket_read_bytes--;
flags &= ~SOCKET_READ_SHORT;
}
}
}
break;
}
case __NR_close: {
if (sock_fd >= 0 && static_cast<int>(regs.args[0]) == sock_fd) {
out_trace->push_back(Event::SocketClose());
sock_fd = -1;
}
break;
}
case __NR_socket: {
const int family = regs.args[0];
const int type = regs.args[1];
if (family == AF_UNIX && type == SOCK_STREAM) {
out_trace->push_back(Event::Socket());
is_socket_call = true;
if (flags & SOCKET_ERROR) {
force_result = -EINVAL;
}
}
break;
}
case __NR_connect: {
const int connect_fd = regs.args[0];
if (sock_fd >= 0 && connect_fd == sock_fd) {
out_trace->push_back(Event::Connect());
if (flags & CONNECT_ERROR) {
force_result = -EINVAL;
} else {
// The test system might not have an entropy daemon running so
// inject a success result.
force_result = 0;
}
}
break;
}
}
if (force_result.has_value()) {
ASSERT_TRUE(regs_break_syscall(child_pid, &regs));
}
ASSERT_EQ(0, ptrace(PTRACE_SYSCALL, child_pid, 0, 0));
ASSERT_EQ(child_pid, waitpid(child_pid, &status, 0));
// If the system call was exit/exit_group, the process may be terminated
// rather than have exited the system call.
if (WIFEXITED(status)) {
ASSERT_EQ(0, WEXITSTATUS(status));
return;
}
// Otherwise the next state must be a system call exit stop. This is
// indistinguishable from a system call entry, we just have to keep track
// and know that these events happen in pairs.
ASSERT_TRUE(WIFSTOPPED(status) && WSTOPSIG(status) == (SIGTRAP | 0x80));
if (force_result.has_value()) {
ASSERT_TRUE(regs_set_ret(child_pid, force_result.value()));
} else if (is_opening_urandom) {
ASSERT_TRUE(regs_read(&regs, child_pid));
urandom_fd = regs.ret;
} else if (is_socket_call) {
ASSERT_TRUE(regs_read(&regs, child_pid));
sock_fd = regs.ret;
} else if (is_socket_read) {
// Simulate a response from the entropy daemon since it might not be
// running on the current system.
uint8_t entropy[kDaemonWriteLength];
ASSERT_LE(socket_read_bytes, sizeof(entropy));
for (size_t i = 0; i < sizeof(entropy); i++) {
entropy[i] = i & 0xff;
}
memcpy_to_remote(child_pid, regs.args[1], entropy, socket_read_bytes);
ASSERT_TRUE(regs_set_ret(child_pid, socket_read_bytes));
}
}
}
// TestFunction is the function that |GetTrace| is asked to trace.
static void TestFunction() {
uint8_t byte;
RAND_bytes(&byte, sizeof(byte));
RAND_bytes(&byte, sizeof(byte));
}
static bool have_fork_detection() { return CRYPTO_get_fork_generation() != 0; }
static bool AppendDaemonEvents(std::vector<Event> *events, unsigned flags) {
events->push_back(Event::Socket());
if (flags & SOCKET_ERROR) {
return false;
}
bool ret = false;
events->push_back(Event::Connect());
if (flags & CONNECT_ERROR) {
goto out;
}
events->push_back(Event::SocketRead(kDaemonWriteLength));
if (flags & SOCKET_READ_ERROR) {
goto out;
}
if (flags & SOCKET_READ_SHORT) {
events->push_back(Event::SocketRead(1));
}
ret = true;
out:
events->push_back(Event::SocketClose());
return ret;
}
// TestFunctionPRNGModel is a model of how the urandom.c code will behave when
// |TestFunction| is run. It should return the same trace of events that
// |GetTrace| will observe the real code making.
static std::vector<Event> TestFunctionPRNGModel(unsigned flags) {
std::vector<Event> ret;
bool getrandom_ready = false;
bool used_daemon = false;
if (have_fork_detection()) {
used_daemon = kUsesDaemon && AppendDaemonEvents(&ret, flags);
}
// Probe for getrandom support
ret.push_back(Event::GetRandom(1, GRND_NONBLOCK));
std::function<void()> wait_for_entropy;
std::function<bool(bool, size_t)> sysrand;
if (flags & NO_GETRANDOM) {
if (kIsFIPS) {
// FIPS builds require getrandom.
ret.push_back(Event::Abort());
return ret;
}
ret.push_back(Event::Open("/dev/urandom"));
if (flags & NO_URANDOM) {
ret.push_back(Event::Abort());
return ret;
}
sysrand = [&ret, flags](bool block, size_t len) {
ret.push_back(Event::UrandomRead(len));
if (flags & URANDOM_ERROR) {
ret.push_back(Event::Abort());
return false;
}
return true;
};
} else {
if (flags & GETRANDOM_ERROR) {
ret.push_back(Event::Abort());
return ret;
}
getrandom_ready = (flags & GETRANDOM_NOT_READY) == 0;
wait_for_entropy = [&ret, &getrandom_ready] {
if (getrandom_ready) {
return;
}
ret.push_back(Event::GetRandom(1, GRND_NONBLOCK));
ret.push_back(Event::GetRandom(1, 0));
getrandom_ready = true;
};
sysrand = [&ret, &wait_for_entropy](bool block, size_t len) {
if (block) {
wait_for_entropy();
}
ret.push_back(Event::GetRandom(len, block ? 0 : GRND_NONBLOCK));
return true;
};
}
const size_t kSeedLength = CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN * (kIsFIPS ? 10 : 1);
const size_t kAdditionalDataLength = 32;
if (!have_rdrand()) {
if (!have_fork_detection()) {
if (!sysrand(true, kAdditionalDataLength)) {
return ret;
}
used_daemon = kUsesDaemon && AppendDaemonEvents(&ret, flags);
}
if ( // Initialise CRNGT.
(!used_daemon && !sysrand(true, kSeedLength + (kIsFIPS ? 16 : 0))) ||
// Personalisation draw if the daemon was used.
(used_daemon && !sysrand(false, CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN)) ||
// Second entropy draw.
(!have_fork_detection() && !sysrand(true, kAdditionalDataLength))) {
return ret;
}
} else if (
// First additional data. If fast RDRAND isn't available then a
// non-blocking OS entropy draw will be tried.
(!have_fast_rdrand() && !have_fork_detection() &&
!sysrand(false, kAdditionalDataLength)) ||
// Opportuntistic entropy draw in FIPS mode because RDRAND was used.
// In non-FIPS mode it's just drawn from |CRYPTO_sysrand| in a blocking
// way.
!sysrand(!kIsFIPS, CTR_DRBG_ENTROPY_LEN) ||
// Second entropy draw's additional data.
(!have_fast_rdrand() && !have_fork_detection() &&
!sysrand(false, kAdditionalDataLength))) {
return ret;
}
return ret;
}
static void CheckInvariants(const std::vector<Event> &events) {
// If RDRAND is available then there should be no blocking syscalls in FIPS
// mode.
#if defined(BORINGSSL_FIPS)
if (have_rdrand()) {
for (const auto &event : events) {
switch (event.type) {
case Event::Syscall::kGetRandom:
if ((event.flags & GRND_NONBLOCK) == 0) {
ADD_FAILURE() << "Blocking getrandom found with RDRAND: "
<< ToString(events);
}
break;
default:
break;
}
}
}
#endif
}
// Tests that |TestFunctionPRNGModel| is a correct model for the code in
// urandom.c, at least to the limits of the the |Event| type.
TEST(URandomTest, Test) {
char buf[256];
// Some Android systems lack getrandom.
uint8_t scratch[1];
const bool has_getrandom =
(syscall(__NR_getrandom, scratch, sizeof(scratch), GRND_NONBLOCK) != -1 ||
errno != ENOSYS);
#define TRACE_FLAG(flag) \
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), #flag ": %d", (flags & flag) != 0); \
SCOPED_TRACE(buf);
for (unsigned flags = 0; flags < NEXT_FLAG; flags++) {
if (!kUsesDaemon && (flags & (SOCKET_ERROR | CONNECT_ERROR |
SOCKET_READ_ERROR | SOCKET_READ_SHORT))) {
// These cases are meaningless unless the code will try to use the entropy
// daemon.
continue;
}
if (!has_getrandom && !(flags & NO_GETRANDOM)) {
continue;
}
TRACE_FLAG(NO_GETRANDOM);
TRACE_FLAG(NO_URANDOM);
TRACE_FLAG(GETRANDOM_NOT_READY);
TRACE_FLAG(GETRANDOM_ERROR);
TRACE_FLAG(URANDOM_ERROR);
TRACE_FLAG(SOCKET_ERROR);
TRACE_FLAG(CONNECT_ERROR);
TRACE_FLAG(SOCKET_READ_ERROR);
TRACE_FLAG(SOCKET_READ_SHORT);
const std::vector<Event> expected_trace = TestFunctionPRNGModel(flags);
CheckInvariants(expected_trace);
std::vector<Event> actual_trace;
GetTrace(&actual_trace, flags, TestFunction);
if (expected_trace != actual_trace) {
ADD_FAILURE() << "Expected: " << ToString(expected_trace)
<< "\nFound: " << ToString(actual_trace);
}
}
}
} // namespace
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
::testing::InitGoogleTest(&argc, argv);
if (getenv("BORINGSSL_IGNORE_MADV_WIPEONFORK")) {
CRYPTO_fork_detect_force_madv_wipeonfork_for_testing(0);
} else {
CRYPTO_fork_detect_force_madv_wipeonfork_for_testing(1);
}
return RUN_ALL_TESTS();
}
#else
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
printf("PASS\n");
return 0;
}
#endif // (X86_64 || AARCH64) && !SHARED_LIBRARY &&
// !UNSAFE_DETERMINISTIC_MODE && USE_NR_getrandom
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