Based on Nekogram. Key additions: - Rebrand to FoxiGram (app name, APK name, applicationId com.foxigram.app) - Embedded Xray (VLESS+Reality) proxy client via JNI libxray.so - Bundled hidden one-tap proxies (LTE + WiFi), read-only in UI - Auto-restore proxy on restart, rebind to active network (LTE/WiFi) - Server credentials externalized to git-ignored XrayServers.java (+ template) - libxray Go source included; compiled .so, keystore, google-services.json ignored
494 lines
13 KiB
C++
494 lines
13 KiB
C++
// Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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// Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
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//
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// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
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// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
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// You may obtain a copy of the License at
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//
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// https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
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//
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// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
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// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
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// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
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// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
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// limitations under the License.
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#include <openssl/ec_key.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/ec.h>
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#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
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#include <openssl/engine.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include <openssl/ex_data.h>
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#include <openssl/mem.h>
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#include <openssl/thread.h>
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#include "../../internal.h"
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#include "../bcm_interface.h"
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#include "../delocate.h"
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#include "../ecdsa/internal.h"
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#include "../service_indicator/internal.h"
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#include "internal.h"
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DEFINE_STATIC_EX_DATA_CLASS(g_ec_ex_data_class)
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static EC_WRAPPED_SCALAR *ec_wrapped_scalar_new(const EC_GROUP *group) {
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EC_WRAPPED_SCALAR *wrapped = reinterpret_cast<EC_WRAPPED_SCALAR *>(
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OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(EC_WRAPPED_SCALAR)));
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if (wrapped == NULL) {
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return NULL;
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}
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wrapped->bignum.d = wrapped->scalar.words;
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wrapped->bignum.width = group->order.N.width;
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wrapped->bignum.dmax = group->order.N.width;
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wrapped->bignum.flags = BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA;
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return wrapped;
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}
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static void ec_wrapped_scalar_free(EC_WRAPPED_SCALAR *scalar) {
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OPENSSL_free(scalar);
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}
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EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new(void) { return EC_KEY_new_method(NULL); }
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EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_method(const ENGINE *engine) {
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EC_KEY *ret = reinterpret_cast<EC_KEY *>(OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(EC_KEY)));
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if (ret == NULL) {
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return NULL;
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}
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if (engine) {
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ret->ecdsa_meth = ENGINE_get_ECDSA_method(engine);
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}
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if (ret->ecdsa_meth) {
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METHOD_ref(ret->ecdsa_meth);
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}
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ret->conv_form = POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED;
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ret->references = 1;
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CRYPTO_new_ex_data(&ret->ex_data);
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if (ret->ecdsa_meth && ret->ecdsa_meth->init && !ret->ecdsa_meth->init(ret)) {
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CRYPTO_free_ex_data(g_ec_ex_data_class_bss_get(), ret, &ret->ex_data);
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if (ret->ecdsa_meth) {
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METHOD_unref(ret->ecdsa_meth);
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}
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OPENSSL_free(ret);
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return NULL;
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}
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return ret;
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}
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EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(int nid) {
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EC_KEY *ret = EC_KEY_new();
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if (ret == NULL) {
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return NULL;
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}
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ret->group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nid);
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if (ret->group == NULL) {
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EC_KEY_free(ret);
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return NULL;
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}
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return ret;
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}
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void EC_KEY_free(EC_KEY *r) {
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if (r == NULL) {
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return;
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}
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if (!CRYPTO_refcount_dec_and_test_zero(&r->references)) {
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return;
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}
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if (r->ecdsa_meth) {
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if (r->ecdsa_meth->finish) {
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r->ecdsa_meth->finish(r);
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}
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METHOD_unref(r->ecdsa_meth);
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}
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CRYPTO_free_ex_data(g_ec_ex_data_class_bss_get(), r, &r->ex_data);
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EC_GROUP_free(r->group);
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EC_POINT_free(r->pub_key);
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ec_wrapped_scalar_free(r->priv_key);
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OPENSSL_free(r);
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}
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EC_KEY *EC_KEY_dup(const EC_KEY *src) {
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if (src == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
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return NULL;
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}
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EC_KEY *ret = EC_KEY_new();
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if (ret == NULL) {
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return NULL;
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}
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if ((src->group != NULL && !EC_KEY_set_group(ret, src->group)) ||
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(src->pub_key != NULL && !EC_KEY_set_public_key(ret, src->pub_key)) ||
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(src->priv_key != NULL &&
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!EC_KEY_set_private_key(ret, EC_KEY_get0_private_key(src)))) {
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EC_KEY_free(ret);
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return NULL;
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}
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ret->enc_flag = src->enc_flag;
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ret->conv_form = src->conv_form;
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return ret;
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}
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int EC_KEY_up_ref(EC_KEY *r) {
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CRYPTO_refcount_inc(&r->references);
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return 1;
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}
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int EC_KEY_is_opaque(const EC_KEY *key) {
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return key->ecdsa_meth && (key->ecdsa_meth->flags & ECDSA_FLAG_OPAQUE);
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}
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const EC_GROUP *EC_KEY_get0_group(const EC_KEY *key) { return key->group; }
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int EC_KEY_set_group(EC_KEY *key, const EC_GROUP *group) {
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// If |key| already has a group, it is an error to switch to another one.
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if (key->group != NULL) {
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if (EC_GROUP_cmp(key->group, group, NULL) != 0) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_GROUP_MISMATCH);
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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assert(key->priv_key == NULL);
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assert(key->pub_key == NULL);
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EC_GROUP_free(key->group);
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key->group = EC_GROUP_dup(group);
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return key->group != NULL;
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}
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const BIGNUM *EC_KEY_get0_private_key(const EC_KEY *key) {
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return key->priv_key != NULL ? &key->priv_key->bignum : NULL;
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}
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int EC_KEY_set_private_key(EC_KEY *key, const BIGNUM *priv_key) {
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if (key->group == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
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return 0;
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}
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EC_WRAPPED_SCALAR *scalar = ec_wrapped_scalar_new(key->group);
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if (scalar == NULL) {
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return 0;
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}
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if (!ec_bignum_to_scalar(key->group, &scalar->scalar, priv_key) ||
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// Zero is not a valid private key, so it is safe to leak the result of
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// this comparison.
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constant_time_declassify_int(
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ec_scalar_is_zero(key->group, &scalar->scalar))) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY);
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ec_wrapped_scalar_free(scalar);
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return 0;
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}
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ec_wrapped_scalar_free(key->priv_key);
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key->priv_key = scalar;
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return 1;
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}
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const EC_POINT *EC_KEY_get0_public_key(const EC_KEY *key) {
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return key->pub_key;
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}
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int EC_KEY_set_public_key(EC_KEY *key, const EC_POINT *pub_key) {
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if (key->group == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
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return 0;
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}
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if (pub_key != NULL && EC_GROUP_cmp(key->group, pub_key->group, NULL) != 0) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_GROUP_MISMATCH);
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return 0;
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}
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EC_POINT_free(key->pub_key);
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key->pub_key = EC_POINT_dup(pub_key, key->group);
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return (key->pub_key == NULL) ? 0 : 1;
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}
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unsigned int EC_KEY_get_enc_flags(const EC_KEY *key) { return key->enc_flag; }
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void EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(EC_KEY *key, unsigned int flags) {
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key->enc_flag = flags;
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}
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point_conversion_form_t EC_KEY_get_conv_form(const EC_KEY *key) {
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return key->conv_form;
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}
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void EC_KEY_set_conv_form(EC_KEY *key, point_conversion_form_t cform) {
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key->conv_form = cform;
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}
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int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey) {
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if (!eckey || !eckey->group || !eckey->pub_key) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
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return 0;
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}
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if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY);
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return 0;
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}
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// Test whether the public key is on the elliptic curve.
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if (!EC_POINT_is_on_curve(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, NULL)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
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return 0;
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}
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// Check the public and private keys match.
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//
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// NOTE: this is a FIPS pair-wise consistency check for the ECDH case. See SP
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// 800-56Ar3, page 36.
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if (eckey->priv_key != NULL) {
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EC_JACOBIAN point;
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if (!ec_point_mul_scalar_base(eckey->group, &point,
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&eckey->priv_key->scalar)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
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return 0;
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}
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// Leaking this comparison only leaks whether |eckey|'s public key was
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// correct.
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if (!constant_time_declassify_int(ec_GFp_simple_points_equal(
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eckey->group, &point, &eckey->pub_key->raw))) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INVALID_PRIVATE_KEY);
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return 0;
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}
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}
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return 1;
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}
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int EC_KEY_check_fips(const EC_KEY *key) {
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int ret = 0;
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FIPS_service_indicator_lock_state();
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if (!EC_KEY_check_key(key)) {
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goto end;
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}
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if (key->priv_key) {
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uint8_t digest[BCM_SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH] = {0};
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uint8_t sig[ECDSA_MAX_FIXED_LEN];
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size_t sig_len;
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if (!ecdsa_sign_fixed(digest, sizeof(digest), sig, &sig_len, sizeof(sig),
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key)) {
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goto end;
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}
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if (boringssl_fips_break_test("ECDSA_PWCT")) {
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digest[0] = ~digest[0];
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}
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if (!ecdsa_verify_fixed(digest, sizeof(digest), sig, sig_len, key)) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_PUBLIC_KEY_VALIDATION_FAILED);
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goto end;
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}
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}
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ret = 1;
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end:
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FIPS_service_indicator_unlock_state();
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if (ret) {
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EC_KEY_keygen_verify_service_indicator(key);
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}
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return ret;
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}
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int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key, const BIGNUM *x,
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const BIGNUM *y) {
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if (!key || !key->group || !x || !y) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
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return 0;
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}
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bssl::UniquePtr<EC_POINT> point(EC_POINT_new(key->group));
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if (point == nullptr ||
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!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(key->group, point.get(), x, y,
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nullptr) ||
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!EC_KEY_set_public_key(key, point.get()) || //
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!EC_KEY_check_key(key)) {
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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int EC_KEY_oct2key(EC_KEY *key, const uint8_t *in, size_t len, BN_CTX *ctx) {
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if (key->group == nullptr) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
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return 0;
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}
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bssl::UniquePtr<EC_POINT> point(EC_POINT_new(key->group));
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return point != nullptr &&
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EC_POINT_oct2point(key->group, point.get(), in, len, ctx) &&
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EC_KEY_set_public_key(key, point.get());
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}
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size_t EC_KEY_key2buf(const EC_KEY *key, point_conversion_form_t form,
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uint8_t **out_buf, BN_CTX *ctx) {
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if (key == NULL || key->pub_key == NULL || key->group == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
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return 0;
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}
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return EC_POINT_point2buf(key->group, key->pub_key, form, out_buf, ctx);
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}
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int EC_KEY_oct2priv(EC_KEY *key, const uint8_t *in, size_t len) {
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if (key->group == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
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return 0;
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}
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if (len != BN_num_bytes(EC_GROUP_get0_order(key->group))) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_DECODE_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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BIGNUM *priv_key = BN_bin2bn(in, len, NULL);
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int ok = priv_key != NULL && //
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EC_KEY_set_private_key(key, priv_key);
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BN_free(priv_key);
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return ok;
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}
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size_t EC_KEY_priv2oct(const EC_KEY *key, uint8_t *out, size_t max_out) {
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if (key->group == NULL || key->priv_key == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
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return 0;
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}
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size_t len = BN_num_bytes(EC_GROUP_get0_order(key->group));
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if (out == NULL) {
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return len;
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}
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if (max_out < len) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
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return 0;
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}
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size_t bytes_written;
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ec_scalar_to_bytes(key->group, out, &bytes_written, &key->priv_key->scalar);
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assert(bytes_written == len);
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return len;
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}
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size_t EC_KEY_priv2buf(const EC_KEY *key, uint8_t **out_buf) {
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*out_buf = NULL;
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size_t len = EC_KEY_priv2oct(key, NULL, 0);
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if (len == 0) {
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return 0;
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}
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uint8_t *buf = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(OPENSSL_malloc(len));
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if (buf == NULL) {
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return 0;
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}
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len = EC_KEY_priv2oct(key, buf, len);
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if (len == 0) {
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OPENSSL_free(buf);
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return 0;
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}
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*out_buf = buf;
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return len;
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}
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int EC_KEY_generate_key(EC_KEY *key) {
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if (key == NULL || key->group == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
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return 0;
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}
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// Check that the group order is FIPS compliant (FIPS 186-4 B.4.2).
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if (EC_GROUP_order_bits(key->group) < 160) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
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return 0;
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}
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static const uint8_t kDefaultAdditionalData[32] = {0};
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EC_WRAPPED_SCALAR *priv_key = ec_wrapped_scalar_new(key->group);
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EC_POINT *pub_key = EC_POINT_new(key->group);
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if (priv_key == NULL || pub_key == NULL ||
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// Generate the private key by testing candidates (FIPS 186-4 B.4.2).
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!ec_random_nonzero_scalar(key->group, &priv_key->scalar,
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kDefaultAdditionalData) ||
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!ec_point_mul_scalar_base(key->group, &pub_key->raw, &priv_key->scalar)) {
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EC_POINT_free(pub_key);
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ec_wrapped_scalar_free(priv_key);
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return 0;
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}
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// The public key is derived from the private key, but it is public.
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//
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// TODO(crbug.com/boringssl/677): This isn't quite right. While |pub_key|
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// represents a public point, it is still in Jacobian form and the exact
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// Jacobian representation is secret. We need to make it affine first. See
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// discussion in the bug.
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CONSTTIME_DECLASSIFY(&pub_key->raw, sizeof(pub_key->raw));
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ec_wrapped_scalar_free(key->priv_key);
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key->priv_key = priv_key;
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EC_POINT_free(key->pub_key);
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key->pub_key = pub_key;
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return 1;
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}
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int EC_KEY_generate_key_fips(EC_KEY *eckey) {
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if (eckey == NULL || eckey->group == NULL) {
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OPENSSL_PUT_ERROR(EC, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
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return 0;
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}
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boringssl_ensure_ecc_self_test();
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if (EC_KEY_generate_key(eckey) && EC_KEY_check_fips(eckey)) {
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return 1;
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}
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EC_POINT_free(eckey->pub_key);
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ec_wrapped_scalar_free(eckey->priv_key);
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eckey->pub_key = NULL;
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eckey->priv_key = NULL;
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return 0;
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}
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int EC_KEY_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_unused *unused,
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CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_unused,
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|
CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) {
|
|
return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index_ex(g_ec_ex_data_class_bss_get(), argl, argp,
|
|
free_func);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int EC_KEY_set_ex_data(EC_KEY *d, int idx, void *arg) {
|
|
return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx, arg);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void *EC_KEY_get_ex_data(const EC_KEY *d, int idx) {
|
|
return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&d->ex_data, idx);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(EC_KEY *key, int flag) {}
|